If this is a recession, I want one.
如果这就是经济大萧条,我也想要来一次
by Joe Zhang
作者 Joe Zhang 译者:武汉一心一译 (
www.once-translation.com)
Several years ago, a British MP remarked, while visiting Tokyo, "If this is a recession, I want one." I know what he meant. Each time I visit Japan, I ask myself, "When can we live like the Japanese?"
几年前,一位英国国会议员在访问东京的时候说:“如果这就是传说中的经济大萧条,我也要一次这样的萧条。”我明白这位译员的意思,每次我到日本,都会问自己,“我们什么时候才能想日本人一样生活?”
Too much has been written by serious observers, as well as analytical tourists, on Japan's two lost decades, and the misery of an aging population, social dislocation, and a looming debt crisis. We were told, again and again, that Japan was hopeless.
有太多观察员和分析调查员,对日本“失落的二十年”写了评价-日本社会经历着,人口老龄化,社会混乱,债务危机等悲剧。一次又一次,我们听到或者读到,日本没戏了。
Then came a refreshing and well-researched rebuttal in "Bending Adversity: Japan and the Art of Survival" by David Pilling, the Asia Editor of the Financial Times.
然而,一篇来自《经融时报》亚洲区编辑David Pilling的报道-“逆流而上:日本及其生存的艺术”,运用充分的客观研究,和振奋人心的语言驳斥了“日本没戏”的论调。
Pilling points out that, despite a sharp slowdown in the last two decades, Japan remains the world's third biggest economy, equivalent to the sum of the UK and France, or three times the Indian economy. In per capita terms, Japan is eight times as affluent as China.
Pilling指出,尽管在过去二十年日本经历了经济大滑坡,但日本仍是世界第三大经济体,相当于英国和法国的总和,或者说相当于印度经济总量的三倍,按人均经济持有量计算,日本是中国的八倍。
In a world obsessed with rankings, Pilling asks the question, quoting his interviewees in Japan, "Why does Japan have to be number three or number 10 or even 15?" In the next two decades, no matter what happens to Japan as a country, it will remain very wealthy, just like a giant Switzerland. Is there anything wrong with that?
这是个看重排名的世界, Pilling引用日本采访对象的话,问到“为什么日本就必须是第三,第10,或者第15呢?”这接下来的二十年里,无论日本发生了什么,它都仍然十分的富裕,它就像一个放大版瑞士,就是这么强。
Economists often speak of "population dividends", as if population growth were a leading indicator of success. But Pilling echoed the sentiment of his colleague Victor Mallet who has written convincingly about "population disaster" as part of a great volume edited by Mckinsey & Company, "Reimagining India." Pilling asks, the Pakistani population has quadrupled since 1960, but where is the correlation with economic growth and, more importantly, the wellbeing of its citizens? Indeed, most of the third world today (including China) is deeply troubled by overpopulation.
经济学家常提到“人口红利”,好像就是说人口增长是成功的首要指标。但是Pilling回想了他的大学同学Victor Mallet写过的一篇文章,文章在麦肯锡咨询公司的《重塑印度》大幅刊登,文章坚定的论调指出人口不一定意味着经济增长,并指出“人口灾难”的概念。Pilling说,自1960年开始巴基斯坦人口已经翻了四倍,但是你哪里看到了经济增长?更重要的是,人们的福利却变得更差?诚然,大多数第三世界国家(包括中国),仍然被过分增长的人口所困扰。
Despite the collapse of Japan's economic growth in 1991, Japan did not do too badly compared to the US and the UK even in growth terms. Pilling points out, stripping out inflation (or deflation) and population changes, Japan did only slightly worse than the US and the UK in these two decades. Rebased to 100 in 1989, Japan's per-capita real income in 2013 would be 127, compared to 137 in the US and 144 in the UK. In a more recent decade (2002-12), Japan even outperformed the US and UK.
尽管日本经济在1991年开始停止增长,但是比起美国和英国,日本做的不算太差,甚至比后者的经济增长期做的都好。Pilling指出,不考虑通货膨胀(或者通货紧缩)和人口改变因素,在这二十年间,日本的经济只是比美国和英国稍稍差点。以1989年基础值100为准,2013年日本的人均收入为127,而美国是137,英国是144.在最近的10年间(2002-12),日本经济甚至比美国和英国表现更好。
It is true that Japan suffers many social ills. But that's true of all countries. In most other countries, the problem is only more severe. By most common measures, Japan boasts the cleanest environment, least amount of inequality, and lowest crime rate.
诚然,日本的社会问题较多,但所有的国家不都是这样的吗?在大多数国家,问题更严重。通过采取最为普遍整理措施,日本引以为傲的有最干净的环境,最少的不平等现象,和最低的犯罪率。
Pilling attributes Japan's two "lost" decades to the asset bubble in the late 1980s, and his advice for Japan and other countries is never get into an asset bubble in the first place. I am skeptical about his diagnosis and the subsequent prescription. Is it possible that the collapse of the bubble in Japan was as inevitable as the subprime crisis in the US?
Pilling将日本“失落的20年”归咎于1980年代的资产泡沫,他建议日本以及其它国家,永远不要进入资产泡沫。我对他的观点和后续的措施表示怀疑。日本的资产泡沫难道真的与美国的次贷危机一样不可避免,非破灭不可?
In the wake of the US crisis, everyone has pinned blame on greedy bankers and clueless regulators. But when are bankers not greedy and regulators not clueless? The real origin of the crisis, in my view, may lie in capitalism itself. As Karl Marx asserted long ago, productivity gains would lead to overproduction, economic crisis, and the destruction of the surplus production. In other words, three steps forward and two steps back is a built-in stabilizer in capitalism.
与美国次贷危机一样,人人都将责任归咎于贪婪的银行家和无能的监管机构。但是银行家和监管机构不一直都是这样吗?在我看来,危机真正的原因,也许就是资本主义本身。 卡尔.马克思很早就提出,生产效率的提高会导致生产过剩,经济危机,和生产过剩毁灭。换句话说,在资本主义这个机制中,一直都有这种“向前走三步,然后向后走两步”的维持内在稳定的模式。
Pilling agrees with most observers that low economic growth coupled with an aging population make Japan's already high public debt increasingly hard to service. But what makes Japan different is that over 90 percent of its debt is owed to its own citizens. So, as Pilling points out, when rating agencies downgraded the ratings of the Japanese government bonds a few years ago, the prices of these bonds went up, not down - another sign that even the smartest observers often do not get it.
Pilling与多数观察者的意见一样,认为经济发展缓慢加上人口老龄化,使得日本原本就比较高的国债雪上加上,但与其它国家不一样的日,日本超过90%的国债都属于其国民。所以,Pilling认为,当信用等级评定机构,在几年前降低了日本国债等级后,这些国债的价格反而上升,并没有下降-这个现象即使是最明智的观察者都始料未及的。
But still, Japan will eventually have to find a way out of the growing debt pile. While Pilling does not speculate on possible solutions, I have a half-baked idea. If Japan creates a large number of state-owned enterprises funded by the printing press of the Bank of Japan, it may kill two birds with one stone: boosting economic activity and creating inflation. When inflation arrives, debts will soon fade into historical irrelevance.
即便如此,日本仍然需要找到一个最终的解决办法,解决国债不断增加的危机。然而对于国债危机,没有可能的解决办法,我到时有个半成熟的想法。如果日本创造大量的国有企业,这些企业,靠日本银行不断印刷钞票,从而或者资金援助,这就是一个典型的一石二鸟的办法:既促进了经济活动,有造成了通货膨胀。当通货膨胀到达是,债务危机很快也就退去,变得无关紧要。
The same formula may even work in the Eurozone. But that is an ideological taboo. However, the West has broken many such taboos in the wake of the global subprime crisis so why not this taboo? In the past three decades, China has ignored the independence of the central bank, and that seemed to work in creating economic activity and generating inflation. Maybe it is worth a try in the west in exceptional circumstances?
同样地,这个方法也适用于欧洲。但那只是一个意识形态上的禁忌。伴随这全球次贷危机,西方已经打破了许多这样的禁忌,凭什么这个禁忌不会被打破呢?在过去的30年间,中国一忽视中央银行的独立性,而这失误挺奏效,激发了经济活动,也催生了通货膨胀。也许对于西方国家,这个方法可以在特殊情况下,值得一试。
The writer is the chairman of China Smartpay Group, and an advisor to Haitong International Securities.
本文的作者是中国Smartpay集团的主席,也是海通国际证券公司的特邀顾问。